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Abstract Lack of shared understanding is frequently
found to be the main cause when accidents are investi-
gated. Still, few studies explicitly explore and document
the causal effects of shared understanding in successful
work. Thus, the attribution of insufficient shared under-
standing as an accident cause lacks the substantiation of
shared understanding as a contributor to successful work.
In this article a case of measurement discrepancies in an
offshore drilling operation is studied, and in the elaboration
of the case shared understanding is found not to qualify as a
condition with significant impact on the collaborative
work. One important reason for this is the epistemological
inadequacy of the different concepts of shared under-
standing. Although more critical research on shared
understanding is needed before one can conclude more
generic on this topic, the findings are important to the
current development of Integrated Operations where shared
understanding is pointed out as an important target area.
Keywords Shared understanding  Coordination 
Cooperative work  Distributed cognition  Integrated
operations
A scene from an offshore drilling operation: at two
different stages of the operation, the measurements
of the same depth show different results. Due to
different types of risks and success criteria, the sig-
nificance of the depth measurement reliability is dif-
ferent in the short and the long time perspective. The
relevant time perspective also differs for the actors
involved; while the drilling engineers have a short
time perspective and are willing to accept an accu-
racy in the range of decimetres, the reservoir engi-
neers have a longer time perspective and require less
uncertainty of measurements. What role does shared
understanding between the actors play in such
a situation?
1 Introduction and objective
Modern industries are characterised by a high degree of
division of labour. The cooperation between different
disciplines and expertises within organisations, and the
coordination of the contributions of the different actors into
collective achievements to ensure safe and efficient oper-
ations in risk-exposed industries is thus an important field
for research. The topic has been treated in a range of work
place studies within many different domains such as avi-
ation (Endsley 1999; Hutchins 1995a, b; Suchman 1996;
Weick and Roberts 1993), health care (Munkvold and
Ellingsen 2007; Tjora 2000), underground control centres
(Heath and Luff 1992), the petroleum industry (Almklov
2006; Hepsø 2006; Rolland et al. 2006), and in more
general workplace studies (Engestro¨m and Middleton
1996; Heath et al. 2000).
The recurrence of the theme shared understanding, in
different forms, indicates its relevance for collaborative
work. However, the nature of shared understanding as such
is not clear. There exists a range of different conceptuali-
sations of the phenomenon (see Sect. 2), and the role of
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these concepts in collaborative work is generally taken for
granted and not scrutinised.
Lack of shared understanding is often pointed out as a
main cause of failure (see e.g., Klein 2005; MacMillan
et al. 2004; Roth et al. 2006). Accidents are often shown to
coincide with, and thus believed to be caused by, a
breakdown in shared understanding. Conversely, a high
degree of shared understanding is seen as a contributor to
safe and efficient operations. The US Army thus states that
‘‘(…) shared situational awareness, coupled with the
ability to conduct continuous operations, will allow
Force XXI armies to observe, decide, and act faster,
more correctly, and more precisely than their ene-
mies’’ (TRADOC 1995, paragraph 1–2),
and in connection with integrated operations, it is stated that
‘‘shared understanding has a significant impact on the
ability of teams to coordinate their work and perform well’’
(Grøtan et al. 2009:2221). This straightforward coupling
between shared understanding and safe and efficient
collaborative work is problematic, since shared understand-
ing is an underspecified phenomenon, and shared situation
awareness, for example, is ‘‘elusive and ill-defined, and
does not lend itself easily to traditional scientific evalua-
tion’’ (Nofi 2000:71). Actually, an alignment of under-
standing and awareness is not always desirable:
‘‘Agents within a system each hold their own situa-
tion awareness, which may be very different from
(although compatible with) that of other agents. (…)
We should not always hope for, or indeed want,
sharing of this awareness, as different system agents
have different purposes’’ (Stanton et al. 2006:1288).
The writings on group think (Janis 1972), conceptual slack
(Schulman 1993), requisite variety (Weick 2007) and
ambiguity (Antonsen 2009) is also a reminder that shared
understanding is not necessarily an precondition for safe
and efficient collaborative work.
The objective of this article is to explore different
conceptualisations of shared understanding by applying
them to a real case of collaborative work where the actors’
goals and success criteria are not unanimous. The relations
between the concepts will be investigated, as well as their
ability to explain and affect the safety and efficiency of
collaborative work process. The results are believed to be
important to the further development of integrated opera-
tions, an operating regime whose safe and efficient col-
laboration is often held to go be connected to shared
understanding (see e.g., Grøtan et al. 2009; Kaarstad et al.
2009).
Different concepts of shared understanding—common
ground, shared situation awareness and common informa-
tion spaces (CIS)—are compared and applied to a case to
explore their contribution to the cooperative work. The
field of study is an onshore rig team within an international
petroleum company. Being responsible for the offshore
drilling operations, the rig team writes the drilling program
and follows up its execution. In practice, this work involves
cooperation between the rig team and a range of other
actors such as the offshore rig crew and the drilling con-
tractor, onshore geology and reservoir experts and service
companies with different types of specialist expertise that
are needed in the different stages of a well project.
2 Shared understanding in the literature
A characteristic feature of modern industries is the division
of labour that renders possible a high degree of speciali-
sation and the accomplishment of highly complex work. A
challenging implication of this division of labour is the
work related to coordinating the different contributions—to
put together what has been divided. It is possible to identify
two different approaches to describe and explain this type
of work. One describes the cognitive processes involved in
the work, and underscores that these processes are dis-
tributed over humans and artefacts rather than being indi-
vidual mental processes. Just as the cognitive processes of
a sociotechnical system can be described as distributed
(Artman and Garbis 1998; Hutchins 1995a, b), the way the
system may have a common situational understanding is
best described as a distributed understanding1 (in contrast
to overlapping). This approach will be revisited towards the
end of the article, when the conclusions are drawn.
The other tradition, which is thoroughly explored in this
article, focuses on shared understanding as a central entity
for successful collaborative work. The terminology, how-
ever, is not uniform across the disciplines following this
tradition; each discipline adopts its own concept and fills it
with its own meaning. With slightly different connotations,
the concepts are many; common understanding, team
shared awareness, shared understanding, group situational
awareness, shared cognition, team awareness, coherent
tactical picture, common ground, shared work space
awareness, team cognition, shared mental models and
common information spaces (see e.g., Bannon and Bødker
1997; Nofi 2000; Roth et al. 2006).
In the following, three distinct concepts for shared
understanding will be shortly reviewed: common ground,
shared situation awareness and CIS. The selection is made
with the purpose of covering different disciplines and dif-
ferent epistemological perspectives; a social constructive
1 Stanton et al. (2006) calls it distributed situation awareness. Here
distributed understanding is used to avoid unnecessary confusion with
Endsley’s (2000) concept.
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view, a realistic view and a sociotechnical, relativistic
view. The selection thus covers some central aspects of
knowledge and collaboration; the involved actors perceive,
and they share their perceptions through social and tech-
nical interaction. Thereafter, an occurrence from the
observation study will be reviewed and serve as a case for
exploring how the different types of shared understanding
relate to the coordination and accomplishment of the work.
It is important to note that it is not the qualities and
pertinence of the different concepts as such that are
investigated, but the way the concepts are used to explain
the outcome of collaborative work.
2.1 Common ground
The notion of common ground is rooted in Herbert Clark’s
contribution theory. It was coined to describe the way
people achieve joint understanding, in the form of ‘‘mutual
knowledge, mutual beliefs, and mutual assumptions’’
(Clark and Brennan 1991:127) in the course of conversa-
tion. The process by which common ground is achieved
between two or more participants is called a grounding
process. The grounding criterion is met when ‘‘the con-
tributor and his or her partners mutually believe that the
partners have understood what the contributor meant to a
criterion sufficient for current purposes’’ (Clark and
Brennan 1991:129).
The contribution theory that serves as the theoretical
base for the formation of common ground is primarily a
theory of discourse. That is, the focus is on the process of
and the resources available for sharing already achieved
understandings rather than the process of gaining new
knowledge about the world. The significance of media
through which the communication between the participants
takes place is evaluated only for media which are dedicated
to communication support. This has been subject to the
criticism that contribution theory and common ground does
not take into account other aspects of communication and
cooperation such as embodied phenomena and the material
and social environment (Koschmann and LeBaron 2003).
Common ground as a basis for cooperation involves a
social constructivist approach to cooperative work. Basing
cooperation on common ground, or shared understanding,
implies much focus on communication about the world and
little focus on accounting for what makes up this world (see
e.g., Beers et al. 2005). It also builds on the assumption that
the participants are informing each other, rather than cre-
ating new knowledge together; hence the social construc-
tivist label to distinguish it from the more sociotechnical
epistemology of common information spaces (see Sect.
2.3).
Clark and Brennan adapt Grice’s (1975) principles of
least effort in the grounding process into an adjusted
principle of least cooperative effort; ‘‘In conversation, the
participants try to minimise their collaborative effort—the
work that both do from the initiation of each contribution to
its mutual acceptance’’ (Clark and Brennan 1991:135).
This is obviously relevant for the cost-efficient achieve-
ment of common ground. How this common ground in turn
affects the production of safe and efficient collaboration,
however, is not well documented.
2.2 Shared situation awareness
The notion of shared situation awareness has been widely
used in the field of human factors. Central contributions
have come from the field of psychology, and aviation has
been one of the industries where it has found application. It
builds on the more generic concept of situation awareness,
defined as ‘‘the perception of elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of
their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near
future’’ (Endsley 1988:97). As an extension of this concept,
shared situation awareness refers to the intersection of
situation awareness among several actors. Endsley and
Jones define shared situation awareness as ‘‘the degree to
which team members possess the same SA2 on shared SA
requirements’’ (Endsley and Jones 1997:37).
Situation awareness is based on a realistic epistemology,
with a focus on objective perception of cues, comprehen-
sion of their meanings and projection to forecast future
events presupposes a view where phenomena are out there,
ready to be perceived, and that the challenge is to perceive
them as precisely as possible.
Although widely used and accepted, the use of deficient
situation awareness as a condition explaining why acci-
dents happen (e.g. Aeronautica Civil de Colombia 1996;
National Transportation Safety Board 1994), has been
criticised by Billings (1996) and Dekker and Hollnagel
(2004) for being deficient and tautological, and that the
usage takes place.
‘‘without further specification of the psychological
mechanism that might possibly be responsible for the
observed behaviour—much less of how such mech-
anism could force the sequence of events toward its
eventual outcome’’ (Dekker and Hollnagel 2004:79).
2.3 Common information spaces
In the field of computer-supported cooperative work, a
concept that has received much attention is (CIS).
Although the concept is vaguely defined and has been used
in many different ways, a definition that was coined in the
2 Situation awareness.
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early 1990s is still referred to by many contemporary
writers (e.g. Bossen 2002; Fields 2005; Munkvold and
Ellingsen 2007; Rolland et al. 2006). A CIS comprises ‘‘the
artifacts that are accessible to a cooperative ensemble as
well as the meaning attributed to these artifacts by the
actors’’ (Schmidt and Bannon 1992:21). A CIS is a space in
which people can work cooperatively by
‘‘maintaining a central archive of organizational
information with some level of ‘shared’ agreement as
to the meaning of this information (locally con-
structed), despite the marked differences concerning
the origins and context of these information items.
The space is constituted and maintained by different
actors employing different conceptualizations and
multiple decision making strategies, supported by
technology’’ (Schmidt and Bannon 1992:16).
These spaces can apply in situations where people are
co-present in time and space, or they can apply to settings
where people work ‘‘across time and space boundaries’’
(Bannon and Bødker 1997:2). In the latter case, the issue
of stability is important since the CIS is to support
distributed work in the course of time. People who work
across large distances, perhaps not even aware of each
other’s presence and work contributions, need to relate to
the same information and its attributed meanings. To
support settings that differ with respect to boundaries of
space and time, Bannon and Bødker (1997) suggest that
the nature of the CIS need to be dialectic. Within local
communities of practice (Brown 1991), the CIS might be
open and malleable, allowing for interpretation and
negotiation. CIS that serve cooperative work distributed
over time and space, on the other hand, must allow for
closure and immutability to function as immutable
mobiles (Latour 1987) that can be transported between
locations.
The concept of CIS is hence more relativistic than those
of common ground and shared situation awareness.
Whereas situation awareness is referred to as ecological
realism (Endsley 2000; Flach 1995), CIS resemble the
sociotechnical relativistic epistemology as described by
Latour (e.g. 1999). The focus is on alignment of artefacts
and the meanings ascribed to them. In this way, not only
the understanding, but also the empirical world to under-
stand is based on construction rather than perception.
CIS does not avoid criticism. Among the characterisa-
tions is the view that ‘‘the very notion of CIS is radically
underspecified’’ (Randall 2000:17), and that
‘‘there are a number of serious problems with the
concept, and the way it is often used today. It would
appear that rather than clarify matters, the label may
only obfuscate’’ (Bannon 2000:1).
2.4 Shared understanding and integrated operations
In the traditional petroleum industry, the division of labour
is accompanied by a division of knowledge. A high degree
of specialisation poses a challenge to the actors when
decisions need to be based on a holistic understanding, and
when the goals guiding the decisions differ between dif-
ferent disciplines. As a consequence, decisions that are
taken within one discipline may be suboptimal or even
harmful from the viewpoint of another discipline. This may
typically be the case when two disciplines adopt different
time horizons for their work and its outcome. One example
is the drilling department whose time horizon includes only
the construction of a well, and the subsurface disciplines
whose time horizon is considerably wider, including not
only the well construction but the whole lifetime of the
well. Another issue is that work in the petroleum industry
has traditionally been performed in a mainly offline modus,
with a considerate time delay between the creation of
information and the use of this information for operative
decisions.
These are among the challenges that are addressed by
change processes that can currently be seen throughout the
petroleum industry. The industry is undergoing a socio-
technical change process in the pursuit of more integrated
operations. Technological and organisational efforts are
made to modernise an industry which is characterised by
disintegration both in terms of knowledge and geographical
allocations (OLF 2005).
The strategy is given different names by different
companies, such as e-field, intelligent field and smart field.
In Norway, the term that has been commonly adopted is
integrated operations. By tying people and information
closer together across geographical distances and knowl-
edge borders, the goal is to make offshore operations faster,
better and safer (OLF 2005).
Closer integration of people, technology and informa-
tion is one of the petroleum industry’s responses to
increasingly demanding operations with respect to reser-
voir characteristics, HSE3 and profitability. Integrated
operations apply new technologies and new work processes
to make data and information available to those who can
make use of it, in real-time, to make collective and holistic
decisions and to automate work processes. The techno-
logical innovations encompass a range of different aspects.
New, more and better sensors shall provide more infor-
mation of higher quality. Enhanced signal transportation
along wired drill-pipes will make a radically increased
sampling rate and bit rate of subsurface data available in
real-time. Enhanced information processing renders real-
time updating of better models possible. New systems for
3 Health, safety and environment.
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monitoring operations will detect deviations that occur, or
give warnings before they occur. Automation will, to some
extent, substitute human reasoning and action and stan-
dardise operations so that they are performed consistently
and within safe operations windows (Iversen et al. 2006,
2007; Rommetveit et al. 2004, 2008).
The new work processes involve closer integration of
onshore and offshore personnel, as well as closer inte-
gration of different companies onshore. Better information
and communication infrastructure will increase the use of
video conferences and sharing of documents, pictures,
graphs etc. The establishment of centralised expert centres
will ensure that a limited number of experts can serve a
large number of operations. A more global approach to
operations and services will lead to the transcendence of
time zones through a follow-the-sun allocation of tasks,
presumptively resulting in faster, better and safer opera-
tions (Løwe´n et al. 2009; OLF 2005; Ringstad and
Andersen 2006).
Shared understanding is a topic of much interest in
relation to integrated operations (e.g. Andresen et al. 2006;
Grøtan et al. 2009; Hepsø 2006; Rolland et al. 2006;
Skarholt et al. 2008; Tinmannsvik 2008). A potential of
technologies and work processes closely linked with inte-
grated operations to promote shared understanding should
be seen in relation to careful considerations of what shared
understanding means in practice, and what role it plays in
the cooperative work. This paper addresses these issues,
and it does so by following the advice of Hollnagel (2009)
and Dekker (2006) to study normal work rather than fail-
ures. Hollnagel claims that ‘‘(…) if the probability of
failure is as high as 10-4, there are still 9,999 successes for
every failure, hence a much better basis for learning’’
(Hollnagel 2009:83), therefore ‘‘we should try to under-
stand and explain the normal, rather than the exceptions’’
(Hollnagel 2009:97).
3 Method
The study of shared understanding in cooperative work was
undertaken as an observation study in an international
petroleum company. Over a period of 8 weeks, the author
joined an onshore rig team as an observant. The rig team is
located in one of the company’s five regional onshore
offices responsible for following up the offshore operations
on the Norwegian continental shelf. The team is respon-
sible for all drilling operations at one specific field. During
the fieldwork, one well project—the drilling of one well—
was observed from beginning to end.
The study offered an insight into the many different
work processes within the team responsible for the offshore
drilling operations. Access to the team was granted by the
team leader (drilling superintendent), and allowed the
author to join the team in their everyday work in their
landscaped office and their daily video-conferences with
the offshore rig crew and other partners. The author was
also granted a nearly unrestricted admission to any ad hoc
meetings that were held in the course of the operations.
During the observation study, which also involved par-
ticipation in less formal settings such as coffee break dis-
cussions and the daily lunch break, the author became quite
familiar with the members of the rig crew. As a supplement
to the observation in professional work settings, this was a
valuable trust-building socialisation that prepared the
ground for the interviews that were conducted in the last
part of the study, and for the gradual transition from pure
observation to more participatory inquiries.
Four interviews were conducted, tape recorded and
transcribed. The interviews were conducted in an infor-
mal, conversational manner that allowed the informants to
focus on the topics that they themselves considered
important in relation to cooperative work and shared
understanding. Two of the interviewees were drilling
engineers, a third was the team’s HSE engineer and the
fourth was a reservoir engineer. It should be noted that the
reservoir engineer is not a member of the rig crew, but
plays a central role in parts of the drilling operations. In
addition to the four interviews related to the specific
fieldwork from which the case (see Sect. 4) was collected,
interviews from other fieldworks the author has under-
taken in connection with the same research project have
also been a useful resource for developing a richer
understanding both of the case and of the role of shared
understanding.
Apart from conducting observation and interviews, the
author was also given access to the company’s database
where information about the organisation and its work
processes, best practices and drilling programmes could be
accessed. Considerable time was therefore also spent on
literature review that helped contextualise the technical
information and make it intelligible. With respect to
making information from the professional petroleum
domain intelligible to a social scientist, it should be men-
tioned that the author has a professional background as an
offshore mudlogging geologist. This professional back-
ground was valuable in order to gain a relevant under-
standing of the rig team’s work.
When not working individually in its landscaped office,
the rig team works closely together with the offshore rig
crew and offshore and onshore representatives from service
companies that deliver equipment and services for the
operations. It was thus not only the rig team that was
studied, but a distributed, loosely coupled organisation that
was constituted differently from meeting to meeting,
depending on the meeting agendas.
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As often as possible, morning meetings were observed.
A frequent attendance in these meetings offered the author
a regular update of the drilling status. The same was the
case for meetings where detailed operating procedures
were reviewed before they were carried out. These meet-
ings were held prior to special operations such as running
of casing, cementing jobs, sidekicks etc. In addition, ad hoc
meetings that were initiated by contingent events were
especially interesting, since these meetings represented
occasions where drilling problems were elaborated on the
spot, with minimal preceding alignment of viewpoints
between people and across disciplines.
In the regular morning meetings between the onshore
rig team and the offshore rig crew, there was typically
only a basic, minimum attendance. Offshore, this included
the company man, the company drilling engineer,
the toolpusher and the offshore installation manager.4
Depending on the operations, a geologist and a reservoir
engineer were also present. Onshore, the standard staff
consisted of the drilling superintendent, an HSE engineer,
a logistics engineer, a drilling engineer and the leading
drilling engineer. Additionally, operation-specific person-
nel including a geologist, a petrophysicist, a reservoir
engineer and a drilling coordinator from a service com-
pany were also present. Furthermore, the onshore supply
base was always present as a third party in the video
conference. These different types of meetings are impor-
tant arenas for the negotiation and sharing of information
and knowledge, and they thus offered valuable empirical
data to the study.
The study draws on different traditions within qualita-
tive methods. As the research question and the themes in
focus were not formulated clearly in advance of the
observation study, but rather were highlighted by the
observations and the interviews, the approach bears
resemblance to Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded the-
ory. Exactly what was looked for in the data material was
highly influenced by the material itself. Garfinkel’s (1967)
ethnomethodology is another source of inspiration, direct-
ing the main focus on the informants’ own descriptions and
perceptions of their work rather than the scientist’s inter-
pretation of it.
As a central part of the method, informants have been
involved as discussion partners in the rewriting process.
Getting the details of the case right was crucial for elabo-
rating the case in a relevant manner. It was also done in an
attempt to stay as true as possible to the ethnomethod-
ological approach.
4 Perspectives and trade-offs: a case of depth
measurement discrepancies
Contingencies appear frequently in drilling operations. One
challenge faced by the involved actors is thus to relate to
new information that requires interpretation and negotia-
tion and to revise plans and actions accordingly.
Cooperation between the different disciplines involved
in the drilling operations involves extensive articulation
work (Haavik 2010). The division of labour also implies a
division of perspectives, goals and performance measures.
Different disciplines will have different goals and conse-
quently different performance evaluation criteria. The
collective and complex task of drilling and production is
characterised by one informant by the ‘‘inherent dilemmas
of the petroleum industry’’. The decision-making involves
trade-offs between efficiency and thoroughness (Hollnagel
2009), between conflicting goals among the disciplines and
between short and long time perspectives.5 A common
view is that drilling engineers have a short time horizon;
their job is finished when the well is drilled. The success
criteria are that they manage to drill the well technically
optimally, with as few and gentle curves as possible, in safe
distance from other wells in the area, with little down-time
and no accidents. Reservoir engineers, on the other hand,
have a longer time horizon for their work. The positioning
of the well in the reservoir has a significant effect on the
long-term drainage of the reservoir. Hence, whereas a
decision regarding the well path in the reservoir is a
question of technical possibilities for the drilling engineers,
it is a question of long-term hydrocarbon flow, production
and expected profit for the reservoir engineers. Consider
the following statement from one informant:
‘‘To the drilling engineers, a project may be suc-
cessful if the well is drilled without collisions with
other wells in the area and without experiencing any
serious well control issues. To the reservoir engi-
neers, on the other hand, a successful well is one that
is located perfectly in the reservoir, as one well out of
many, so that the total, long-term production from the
reservoir will be as high as possible’’ (reservoir
engineer).
Another informant addresses the issue by referring to
specific strategic trade-offs between drilling efficiency and
4 The company man is the representative of the oil company, while
toolpusher designates the supervisor for the drilling contractor.
5 Although other actors might be involved in issues like the one
discussed in this paper, only two groups of actors will be considered
in this discussion to make the argumentation clear and conceptual.
The actors belong to the drilling and well department and the
petroleum technology department and will in the following be
labelled drilling engineers and reservoir engineers. The onshore rig
team, which was the main locus of the fieldwork, consists mainly of
drilling engineers.
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field knowledge development: a geologist might advise
reducing the rate of penetration through a specific forma-
tion to sample the formation thoroughly. This could be a
strategy to understand the larger field, and might not
necessarily be of any value to the ongoing well project. In
such a situation, the extra drilling time will be accounted
for in the drilling budget, and the drilling engineers might
therefore be reluctant to choose such a strategy since it
represents an expense to their budget without any prospects
to profits in the same budget.
Despite these conflicting interests, there is no way any
of the disciplines can obtain their goals without collabo-
rating closely with the other. The disciplines collaborate in
every phase of a project, from planning to completion.
They are also aware that one discipline’s goal achievement
is worthless if it means that the other discipline does not
reach its goal. The different goals and perspectives are
typically made current when the agreed drilling programme
is challenged by contingencies. The case description below
is a case of such contingencies, and it illustrates the main
point of this article. The different ways of relating to and
accounting for the discrepancies reflect more that simply
different goals; they reflect different epistemological
approaches that do not easily integrate to support the dif-
ferent aspects of shared understanding. The case does not
appear as an extraordinary event for the involved actors,
and the handling of the situation is described as ordinary
work.6
4.1 Case description: depth measurement discrepancies
The rig team that was studied is located in one of the
operating company’s five onshore operative offices along
the west coast of Norway. The office operates six offshore
fields, each field represented by one rig team. The
responsibilities of the teams are to produce drilling pro-
grammes and to follow up their execution.
A well is drilled in several sections. Each section has a
different diameter, largest for the upper section and the
smallest in the last section, which penetrates the reservoir.
A typical sequence of sections’ diameters is 36’’ (inches),
26’’, 17’’, 12’’ and 8’’. The transition between sec-
tions is often determined by the boundaries between two
geological layers. These boundaries therefore play a role
both in the drilling process and in the later production stage
since the boundaries define areas from which oil can be
produced. Other types of boundaries that are used for
navigation are the interfaces between fluid and gas phases
such as the gas/oil contact and the oil/water contact in the
reservoir. It was uncertainty in connection with the depth
measurement of such boundaries during a drilling opera-
tion that formed the point of departure for the case.7 The
schematic presentation of the case offered in Fig. 1 below
might be a useful reference for the following case
description.
The drilling programme advised placing the 8’’ well
section horizontally in the reservoir in a position relative to
the gas/oil contact and the oil/water contact that would
secure production of oil without influx of gas or water. To
do that, it was crucial to determine the precise depth of
either the gas/oil contact or the oil/water contact. These
depths were found by logging the pressure gradient and the
resistivity of the fluid across a depth section. A break in the
pressure gradient will indicate the contact zone between
different fluids. An accurate determination of the depth of
top Garn formation (oil reservoir) was also important since
it defined the top of the reservoir.
In connection with depth measurements, it should be
noted that there are two different types of depth values;
measured depth and vertical depth. Measured depths are
calculated as the sum of every joint making up the drill
string from surface to the drill bit. The composition of the
drill string is listed in a manually produced paper or
computer file, the tally. Vertical depths are then calculated
on the basis of the measured depth and the curvature of the
well path.
In the case, the reservoir was first drilled into with a
12’’ drill bit. The Garn formation was identified and the
vertical depth of the formation top was measured/calcu-
lated. Top Garn was identified 14 m deeper than fore-
casted. The gas/oil contact was not found. This could,
according to the informants, be due to a non-horizontal
boundary between top Garn and the overburden formation,
and a penetration of Garn at location x and not at, for
example, location y as shown in Fig. 1.8 It was therefore
decided to continue drilling a pilot well (see Fig. 1)
through the oil/water contact with an 8’’ drill bit, and
then use the oil/water contact as a depth reference point
instead of the gas/oil contact. Before this could be done, a
casing needed to be run to secure the 12’’ hole. At known
6 To the extent that any work in drilling operations can be described
as ordinary; the contingent, non-standardised nature of drilling
operations, where the underground formations never are identical in
two operations, and never are fully known, implies that every
ordinary work process still is unique.
7 Several situations that appeared during the field study could have
served to illustrate the point of the article. The actual case was chosen
partly because it served well to illustrate the different aspects of
shared understanding, partly for practical reasons; it elapsed during a
limited period of time and involved actors whose contributions were
possible to get an overview of during the observation and the
following interviews.
8 There was no gas/oil contact present at that location. Due to
different specific gravities, the fluids in the reservoir will migrate so
that gas gets on top, oil in the middle and water on bottom. The border
between Garn and the overburden formations is impermeable.
Figure 1 shows the position of the well and of the gas/oil contact.
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positions inside this casing, a few radioactive markers were
placed to function as easily detectable depth reference
points for the next drilling section.
When the drill string subsequently was run into the hole
and through the casing with an 8’’ drill bit some unex-
pected depth discrepancies were observed: Top Garn was
identified 4.5 m deeper in the 8 section than in the 12
section. In addition, when the depth of the radioactive
markers was logged, there was a discrepancy of 1.9 and
0.5 m, respectively between the two measurements.
Although it was the oil/water contact and not the Top Garn
or the radioactive markers that was the reference points to
be used when later kicking off laterally for the main well
(see Fig. 1), this discrepancy raised a dilemma: which
measurements were correct—those measured in the 12’’
section or those of the 8’’? And if the 8’’ pilot well
measurements were unreliable, how could they serve as a
reference for the subsequent main bore? As we shall see,
this last question was related to differently by different
disciplines in the organisation.
Apart from this main depth issue, there was another
topic that indirectly related to the main issue and that had
some of the same characteristics with respect to how it was
related to by the different disciplines. In a video conference
between the onshore rig team and the offshore rig crew, the
offshore operational geologist argued that they should take
more pressure measurements in the reservoir than initially
planned for. The rationale for this was to get a better
understanding of the structure and the geology of the res-
ervoir and to be able to make more accurate model
descriptions of the boundaries between the gas, oil and
water for the larger field. The drilling engineers would
rather avoid this, since such operations are time consuming
and increase the risk of getting stuck due to the standstill of
the pipe during such measurements.
There were thus two issues that the drilling organisation
had to relate to, and did differently. First, there was the
question of the different depth measurements and the
uncertainty of their reliability. This will be called issue A;
the second issue regarded the number of pressure mea-
surements to be taken, and this will be called issue B.
4.2 Possible explanations elaborated by the participants
Issue A was the most troublesome, since there were so
many uncertainties attached to it. There were many pos-
sible sources of error, challenging the reliability of any
accounts of the state of affairs. The issue was first treated in
the morning meeting, which was conducted as a video
conference between the rig and the onshore team. After the
meeting, the reservoir engineers (offshore and onshore) and
the drilling engineers (onshore) discussed the issue sepa-
rately. The issue was again brought up at the morning
meeting the following day. The alternative explanations
that were discussed in this meeting will be briefly reviewed
below.
During the meeting, six main potential sources of error
causing the measurement discrepancy were identified. The
first potential source was an error in the tally, where the
lengths of all components of the drill string are listed. If
the tally did not correspond to the actual make-up of the
drill string, the measured depth would be erroneous. The
second potential source were the radioactive markers
which might have loosened and been pushed upwards
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Fig. 1 Placing the well in the
reservoir (the figure is
conceptual and not correct in
scale or details)
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when running the casing downwards, thus contributing to
the error. The third potential source was the tide which
according to the informants was not usually taken into
account during operations of this kind.9 If the depth
measurements were not correlated to the corresponding
level of the tide for the two measurements, the variance
could amount to 1 to 2 m. The fourth potential source
was a possible difference in the stretching of the drill
string due to the string’s weight in the respective sections.
In the 12’’ section, during the casing running, the
stretching of the drill string would be negligible. In the
8’’ section, on the other hand, the drill string was run
into an open hole and would be much more stretched.
This would theoretically lead to a too small depth mea-
surement. An informant made it clear after the meeting
that they usually not did account for such variations. The
fifth source was the identification of the top Garn for-
mation in the two runs, which was based on resistivity
measurements in the formation and was subject to human
interpretation of resistivity logs. The sixth source was the
amount and the effect of ballast on the rig during the two
runs. It was concluded that ballast could lower the rig by
as much as 2–3 m in the sea. The participants were not
sure whether any differences in ballast had been accoun-
ted for in the two measurements.
Issue B was not subject to as much discussion. In the
second morning meeting, the offshore geologist requested
taking more pressure points than initially agreed upon in the
reservoir section. No decision was made at the time, but the
geologist was asked to reconsider whether this was really
necessary. The issue was elaborated on by some of the rig
team members during lunch the same day. One drilling
engineer commented that every extra pressure point takes
half an hour and costs approximately US $8000. Another
engineer made the remark that the price of such measure-
ments might not be the worst factor. The increased chance
of getting stuck due to standstill of the pipe when the
pressure points are being taken would be more serious. He
concluded that ‘‘we don’t want to spend time on things we
don’t need’’. A third engineer added, humorously: ‘‘Things
we don’t need, no…’’, addressing with obvious self-irony
the different requirements of the different disciplines and
the difficulties of meeting them all concurrently.
The depth discrepancy issue was never fully solved. The
possible explanations were discussed and attempts were
made to combine them to see if they could sum up to the
difference between the measurements. However, when the
drilling operation continued into the 8’’ section, there
existed only different theories and no unambiguous solu-
tion to the case. It was agreed to proceed without any
absolute references of depth, and to place the well relative
to the oil/water contact and to be attentive to any clues that
might appear on the way.
4.3 The meaning of uncertainty to different disciplines
The drilling engineers represent the organisational owners
of depth measurements and positioning of the well. A
reservoir engineer explained that
‘‘These measurements are vitally important to the
drilling engineers to determine the exact well path
only after a well is constructed. Controlling this
means that future wells can be planned for with
sufficient margins in order to avoid collisions with
older wells. To the reservoir engineers, on the other
hand, the significance of real-time positions is vital.
The accuracy and reliability of measurements are
decisive, and they are so during drilling.’’
The informant continues to explain that the view among the
reservoir engineers is that the drilling engineers have much
lower requirements for accuracy in the drilling operations
than the reservoir engineers, and that the drilling contrac-
tors are known to be approximate about depth measure-
ments. It is also a general view among drilling engineers
that reservoir engineers often demand accuracies that are
meaningless given the reliabilities of the methods of
measurement. The informant used the case as an example;
the reservoir engineers want to investigate the reason for
the measurement deviances in order to reduce the devi-
ances to decimetres, while the accuracy of the measure-
ments exceeds those limits by far. A drilling engineer
emphasises that ‘‘some degree of data uncertainty is
impossible to avoid. We just have to live with that’’. The
main difference in the way drilling engineers and reservoir
engineers relate to the uncertainties could perhaps be
illustrated by the following quote from a reservoir engi-
neer: ‘‘When you talk to drilling people, there are very few
who want to hear about uncertainties. Drilling people only
wants a yes or no’’. Understanding the different signifi-
cance of uncertainties to different disciplines is important
for understanding what the measurement discrepancies in
the case mean to the different actors.
5 Discussion
In the introduction it was claimed that poor performance
and accidents are often held to be caused by a lack of
shared understanding, without accounting for the role
shared understanding actually plays in normal, collabora-
tive work. By simply showing the correlation between
accidents and breakdown in shared understanding, and not
9 The installation was a floating rig, and hence the level of the tide
has significance for the depth measurements.
Cogn Tech Work (2011) 13:281–294 289
123
accounting for the causal connections between shared
understanding and successful work, accident investigators
run the risk of drawing incomplete or even wrong con-
clusions with respect to what caused the accident. In the
above case, none of the three conceptualisations of shared
understanding are identified as suitable models for the
driving forces of successful collaboration. To the contrary,
shared understanding does not enter into the description of
the work. This is surprising if lack of shared understanding
is believed to unambiguously affect the collaborative work
and its result in a negative way.
Based on the case reviewed in Sect. 4, the subsequent
sections elaborate in which way shared understanding is
relevant to the work of the drilling engineers and the res-
ervoir engineers. In order to understand the effect of shared
understanding, such an analysis should be undertaken in
accordance with specific and unambiguous definitions. In
addition, the limits of the concepts’ explanatory power
must be acknowledged. Since each concept covers a non-
exhaustive part of shared understanding, a central point
must be to identify what is outside of each concept’s scope,
and what the implications are when different concepts are
incompatible within the same area of application.
5.1 Handling the uncertainties
In the course of the case, the participants elaborated on
their different requirements with respect to issue A. The
reservoir engineers argued for an investigation of the
measurements discrepancy in order to establish an undis-
puted understanding of the true state of the well. Such a
realist decision-making strategy might well end up with a
shared situation awareness. Although the epistemological
preconditions for situation awareness are not clearly
defined, the statement that ‘‘it is entirely possible to have
perfect SA, yet make an incorrect decision’’ (Endsley
2000:8) points towards a realist epistemology. It is hard to
think of a perfect situation awareness and a wrong decision
without relying on the correspondence theory of truth
(Latour 1999). However, correspondence is not an unam-
biguous requirement in drilling operations. The goals of a
discipline influence the state of affairs. The reservoir
engineers’ wish to calculate exactly the stretch effect of the
drill string on the measured depth illustrates this; from the
drilling engineers’ point of view this was not relevant since
this stretch of the drill string under any circumstance would
be much smaller than the overall depth uncertainty. What
was considered as shared situation awareness by the res-
ervoir engineers was considered as an illusion by the
drilling engineers.
The strategy suggested by the drilling engineers was to
abandon the ambition of acquiring any absolute points of
reference and just keep future measurements relative to the
last measurement, undertaking the forthcoming measure-
ment in the exact same way with identical equipment as in
the last measurement. In that way many uncertainties
would become irrelevant; if they had missed out an element
of the drill string, they would ‘miss it out’ again by
applying the same drill string configuration. If the radio-
active markers were out of position, they would still be at
the same position in the next run, since the casing would
not have moved in the meantime. The identification of top
Garn formation would follow the same interpretation
principles. Hence, by using the measurements of the last
section as a reference point for the next, it would be of less
interest whether these measurements were correct or not,
given that the tide and the ballasting during that last run
was accounted for. This approach would involve an
expansion of a CIS into the near future, leaving the con-
figuration of tools and the interpretation of information
unaltered from one situation to the next. This strategy
suggests a more relativistic form of understanding than the
first approach. Whereas the first approach is based on a
form of understanding based on ‘objective facts’, the sec-
ond approach is based on a pragmatic and a constructivist
understanding, on the construction of a CIS.
The choice of approach has consequences beyond the
actual well project. The first approach will contribute to an
understanding not only of the actual reservoir but also to
the wider geomodel of the whole field. The second
approach might serve the accuracy of the singular well
better than the first approach, and is not based on the
accuracy of measurements as much as on the reliability of
relationships between measurements. The drawback is that
the value potential will not be transferred to the wider
geomodel, as in the first approach, since the location-spe-
cific context of the uncertainty cannot be transferred to
operations situated elsewhere.
Issue A (the depth discrepancy) was not discussed in
isolation from other issues. One such issue was issue B (the
number of pressure points), since ‘‘the pressure gradient
could be used to determine the oil/water contact and thus
make oil/water contact an external depth reference that can
be reused in later operations’’ (reservoir engineer). In
addition, ‘‘the gradient could give important information
about the reservoir with respect to faults and prospects for
future production’’ (same informant). Issue B could thus be
understood as an integrated part of issue A in light of a
realist strategy, and it could contribute to the preferred
approach of the reservoir engineers. On the other hand, as
already noted, the drilling engineers were not enthusiastic
about pursuing issue B since it would involve extra costs
that would not contribute to their understanding of the state
of affairs.
With the different perspectives on how to handle the
measurement discrepancies with respect to the local/global
290 Cogn Tech Work (2011) 13:281–294
123
and the short and long time perspective, perhaps common
ground could be the missing link needed to negotiate the
optimal solution? As we shall see in the following sections,
neither common ground, shared situation awareness nor
CIS, as concepts for shared understanding, are fully ade-
quate to support the work and the decisions needed to
handle the discrepancies in the case.
5.2 Not just an issue of communication
(common ground)
Achieving common ground, or ‘‘mutual knowledge, mutual
beliefs, and mutual assumptions’’ (Clark and Brennan
1991:127) with respect to the ongoing operations does not
seem to be the primary challenge for the cooperative work.
The drilling engineers and the reservoir engineers are well
aware of each other’s perspectives and needs with respect
to data accuracy. The elaboration by a drilling engineer on
the limitations with regard to reliability of the measure-
ments wanted by the reservoir engineers shows that the
coordination of decisions related to the case depends more
on trade-offs between accuracy and reliability than on
obtaining common ground. Mutual knowledge, beliefs and
assumptions do not concern the specific situation as much
as they concern the larger goal, which is presented in the
drilling programme of the actual well as ‘‘to drain as much
oil […] as possible from the […] reservoir’’. Whether the
decision is based on the first approach of investigating the
difference in measurements to establish an undisputed
understanding of the true state of the well or the second
approach of abandoning the search for absolute points of
reference and rather keep future measurements relative to
measurements performed with identical equipment, hinges
more on a clear formulation of an overarching goal of the
operations than on mutual knowledge, beliefs and
assumptions—common ground—with respect to the case
of the depth measurements discrepancies. It is on the
overarching level that the decisions can rely on a social
construction. In such specific situations as the present case,
the depth references must also be based on physical mea-
surements of depth and on a specific configuration of the
drill string.
5.3 Objectivity is relative (shared situation awareness)
The perception of issue A and issue B, and their interde-
pendence, depends on whether it is based on a short or a
long time perspective. According to Endsley and Jones
(1997:20), ‘‘situation awareness is highly impacted by a
crew member’s goal and expectations’’. However, since
there are at least two different solutions to the case prob-
lem, one unique reference against which to evaluate its
correctness does not exist. The solution cannot simply be
perceived, it has to be constructed; the participants must
choose how the depth measurements should be handled.
The first, objectivistic approach, which could be justified
with reference to situation awareness, is the one favoured
by the reservoir engineers. The advantage with this
approach is that it is relevant for the larger field and hence
can add to the long-term value-creation. The paradox is
that due to the mentioned limited accuracy of measurement
(see Sect. 4.3) such an approach can turn out to be non-
optimal in the short time perspective, when only the actual
well is accounted for. Thus, a non-contextual evaluation of
this specific well project and the team that undertook it
could be unfavourable. Furthermore, since the actual dril-
ling process is managed by the drilling engineers, not by
the reservoir engineers, it is difficult to argue for such an
approach. As stated by a drilling engineer: ‘‘Some degree
of data uncertainty is impossible to avoid. We just have to
live with that’’.
5.4 Relativity has a limited reach (CIS)
More than a collective mental state corresponding to an
objective reality, the challenge of the rig team is to nego-
tiate and to construct the well with the information and
tools that are available. Seeing the activity to recover
control over the drilling operations as an effort to construct
a CIS renders a variety of extra resources such as the drill
string configuration and relative measurements available to
the participants. With such a perspective, relativity and
context is introduced as an ingredient of knowledge.
Besides, the epistemology that makes such a perspective
possible allows for construction to supplement the less
powerful process of perception. This sociotechnical con-
struction is more comprehensive than the social construc-
tion discussed previously, but not necessarily fully
adequate. Instead of viewing the measurement discrepan-
cies as a problem of communication (common ground) or
shared perception (shared situation awareness), this
approach would find the challenge to be an issue of actively
combining the available social and technical resources
(CIS) into a stable configuration. By including the context
of the measurements of different sections of the well in the
measurements, the measurements turn relative. In this case,
the context is made up of the identified six potential
sources of error highlighted in Sect. 4.2. Including the
context means that the measurements of depths in one
section is transformed from an isolated, objective mea-
surement into a relative measurement that includes a drill
string configuration both of the current section and the
sections to come. The implications of such an approach is,
however, not unproblematic, as shown by this case;
whereas it may increase the reliability of the depth mea-
surements of the different sections in the current well, it
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may reduce the reliability of the same measurements in
future operations where the stability of the CIS has not
been maintained because the context is impossible to
reproduce.
Here, the tension between local and global is made
current. This tension has been emphasised by others (e.g.
Rolland et al. 2006). The dialectic character of a CIS
suggests that it is a temporal entity whose unambiguous
configuration is problematic to transport to another location
in a future operation. In this case, an extension of the CIS
would depend on reproducing the potential sources of
uncertainty at another location. However, since every
location and every operation need equipment and drilling
strategies that are adapted to the local conditions, such an
extension of the CIS would be based on an illusion.
6 From shared understanding to distributed
cognition. Conclusions
A case of measurement discrepancies has been reviewed in
light of different concepts of shared understanding. The
review has been undertaken to investigate how shared
understanding can play an active part in negotiating a
solution to the problem. What the case shows, however, is
that shared understanding is not a requisite in this work.
The different concepts of shared understanding investi-
gated may contribute to solutions that are valid for a spe-
cific time/space combination,10 but when it comes to
supporting solutions that are valid across a wider time/
space domain,11 they are shown to be less functional, even
contradictory. The limited functionality can be traced back
to each concept’s limited area of application (cf. Sect. 5.2–
5.4). The contradictory aspect has to do with the incom-
patible epistemologies that the different concepts of shared
understanding are based on (cf. Sects. 2.1–2.3 and 5.2–5.4).
These limitations could be compared to the limitations of a
map projection where a three-dimensional geographic
relationship is transformed to a two-dimensional surface; a
map projection may be conform (areas are correctly rep-
resented) or equivalent (areas are correctly represented) or
equidistant (distances are correctly represented), but it
cannot satisfy the demands of more than on projection at a
time.
Shared understanding is a central phenomenon in col-
laborative work, and this case study does not challenge its
position as a descriptive phenomenon as such. What it
challenges is the position of shared understanding as a
causal agent in collaborative work where the goals of the
different actors are not unanimous. In such work, where
there is a need for negotiations and mutual adaptation of
the empirical world to the different goals and available
methodologies, the shortcomings of shared understanding
must be acknowledged. Rather than shared, the relevant
collective understanding could be described as distributed,
and although this distributed understanding in itself may
have limited causal powers, it is closely connected to the
more powerful concept of distributed cognition whose
significance is well documented by other authors (e.g.
Artman and Garbis 1998; Hutchins 1995a, b) and which
this case also may serve as an illustration of.
7 Epilogue
The well construction process was brought to an end with
a satisfactory result in spite of the uncertainties with
respect to the depth measurements. The final well report
that more than a year later sums up the operation, the
results and the experiences eventually offers a shared
understanding of what was going on. However, the sig-
nificance of this shared understanding is characterised by
its post-hoc character and the fact that the report does
mention the case at all.
Acknowledgments This research has been funded by the Norwe-
gian Research Council’s Petromaks programme.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Aeronautica Civil de Colombia (1996) Aircraft accident report:
controlled flight into terrain, American Airlines flight 965,
Boeing 757–223, N651AA near Cali, Colombia, 20 Dec 1995.
Aeronautica Civil, Bogota, Colombia
Almklov PG (2006) Kunnskap, kommunikasjon og ekspertise et
antropologisk studium av en tverrfaglig ekspertgruppe i oljein-
dustrien. Norges Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelige Universitet, Fak-
ultet for Samfunnsvitenskap og Teknologiledelse, Trondheim
Andresen G, Grøtan TO, Johnsen SO, Rossness R, Sivertsen T, Steiro
T, Thunem A, Tveiten C (2006) Samhandling over avstand—
erfaringer av relevans for petroleumsbransjen. SINTEF,
Trondheim
Antonsen S (2009) Safety culture: theory, method and improvement.
Ashgate Pub Co, Denmark
Artman H, Garbis C (1998) Situation awareness as distributed
cognition. In: Cognition and cooperation: Proceedings of 9th
conference of cognitive ergonomics, Limerick, pp 151–156
Bannon L (2000) Understanding common information spaces in
CSCW. Paper presented at the workshop on cooperative
organisation of common information spaces. Technical Univer-
sity of Denmark, Denmark
10 The specific well.
11 Future wells and the larger geomodel.
292 Cogn Tech Work (2011) 13:281–294
123
Bannon L, Bødker S (1997) Constructing common information
spaces. In: Proceedings of the fifth conference on European
conference on computer supported cooperative work. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Lancaster, pp 81–96
Beers PJ, Boshuizen HPA, Kirschner PA, Gijselaers WH (2005)
Computer support for knowledge construction in collaborative
learning environments. Comput Human Behav 21(4):623–643
Billings CE (1996) Situation awareness measurement and analysis: a
commentary. In: Garland DJ, Endsley MR (eds) Experimental
analysis and measurement of situation awareness. Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University Press, Daytona Beach, pp 1–6
Bossen C (2002) The parameters of common information spaces: the
heterogeneity of cooperative work at a hospital ward. In:
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM conference on Computer
supported cooperative work. ACM, New Orleans, pp 176–185
Brown JS (1991) Organizational learning and communities-of-
practice: Toward a unified view of working, learning, and
innovation. Organ Sci 2(1):40–57
Clark HH, Brennan SE (1991) Grounding in communication. In:
Resnick LB, Levine JM, Teasley SD (eds) Perspectives on
socially shared cognition. American Psychological Association,
Washington, pp 127–149
Dekker S (2006) Resilience engineering: chronicling the emergence
of confused concensus. In: Hollnagel E, Woods DD, Leveson N
(eds) Resilience engineering, concepts and precepts. Ashgate,
Aldershot, pp 77–92
Dekker S, Hollnagel E (2004) Human factors and folk models. Cogn
Techno Work 6(2):79–86
Endsley MR (1988) Design and evaluation for situation awareness
enhancement. In: Proceedings of the human factors society 32nd
annual meeting. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Santa
Monica, pp 97–101
Endsley MR (1999) Shared situation awareness in the flight deck-
ATC system. IEEE Aerosp Electron Syst Mag 14(8):25–30
Endsley MR (2000) Theoretical underpinnings of situation awareness:
a critical review. In: Endsley MR, Garland DJ (eds) Situation
awareness: analysis and measurement. Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Mahwah, pp 3–28
Endsley MR, Jones WM (1997) Situation awareness, information
dominance, and information warfare (no. Al/cf-tr-1997-0156).
Technical Report 97-01, United States Air Force Armstrong
Laboratory, Texas
Engestro¨m Y, Middleton D (1996) Cognition and communication at
work. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Fields B (2005) Representing collaborative work: the airport as
common information space. Cogn Techno Work 7(2):119–133
Flach JM (1995) Situation awareness: proceed with caution. Hum
Factors 37(1):149–157
Garfinkel H (1967) Studies in ethnomethodology. Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs
Glaser BG, Strauss AL (1967) The discovery of grounded theory:
strategies for qualitative research. Aldine, Chicago
Grice HP (1975) Logic and conversation. In: Cole P, Morgan JL (eds)
Syntax and semantics. 3, speech acts. Seminar Press, New York,
pp 225–242
Grøtan TO, Albrechtsen E, Skarholt K (2009) How shared situational
awareness influence organizational accident risk in the offshore oil
industry. In: 18th European safety and reliability conference (Esrel
2009). CRC Press, Prague, Czech Republic, pp 2207–2214
Haavik T (2010) Making drilling operations visible: the role of
articulation work for organisational safety. Cogn Techno Work
12(4):285–295. doi:10.1007/s10111-010-0139-2
Heath C, Knoblauch H, Luff P (2000) Technology and social
interaction: the emergence of ‘workplace studies’. Br J Sociol
51(2):299–320
Heath C, Luff P (1992) Collaboration and control: crisis management
and multimedia technology in London underground line control
rooms. Comput Support Coop Work 1(1):24–48
Hepsø V (2006) When are we going to address organizational
robustness and collaboration as something else than a residual
factor? Paper presented at the SPE 100712, 2006
Hollnagel E (2009) The ETTO principle: efficiency-thoroughness
trade-off—why things that go right sometimes go wrong.
Ashgate, Aldershot
Hutchins E (1995a) Cognition in the wild. MIT Press, Cambridge
Hutchins E (1995b) How a cockpit remembers its speeds. Cogn Sci
19(3):265–288
Iversen F, Cayeux E, Dvergsnes EW, Gravdal JE, Vefring EH,
Mykletun B, Torsvoll A, Omdal S, Merlo A (2006) Monitoring
and control of drilling utilizing continuously updated process
models. Paper presented at the IADC/SPE Drilling Conference.
Miami, Florida
Iversen F, Cayeux E, Dvergsnes EW, Welmer M, Torsvoll A, Merlo
A (2007) Demonstrating a new system for integrated drilling
control. Paper presented at the AADE National Technical
Conference and Exhibition. Houston, Texas
Janis I (1972) Victims of groupthink. Houghton Mifflin Boston
Kaarstad M, Rindahl G, Torgersen G, Drøivoldsmo A (2009)
Interaction and interaction skills in an integrated operations
setting. Paper presented at the IEA 2009, 17th world congress on
ergonomics. Beijing, China
Klein G (2005) Common ground and coordination in joint activity. In:
Rouse WB, Boff KR (eds) Organizational simulation. Wiley-
Interscience, Hoboken, pp 139–157
Koschmann T, LeBaron CD (2003) Reconsidering common ground:
examining Clark’s contribution theory in the OR. Paper
presented at the European computer-supported cooperative work
(ECSCW 03). Helsinki, Finland
Latour B (1987) Science in action: how to follow scientists and
engineers through society. Open University Press, Milton
Keynes
Latour B (1999) Pandora’s hope: essays on the reality of science
studies. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Løwe´n S, Nyga˚rd BE, Østensen S, Lund T (2009) Subsurface support
centre: a hub for communication of knowledge. Paper presented
at the SPE digital energy conference and exhibition. Houston,
Texas
MacMillan J, Entin EE, Serfaty D (2004) Communication overhead:
the hidden cost of team cognition. In: Salas E, Fiore SM (eds)
Team cognition: understanding the factors that drive process and
performance. American Psychological Association, Washington,
pp 61–82
Munkvold G, Ellingsen G (2007) Common information spaces along
the illness trajectories of chronic patients. In: Proceedings of the
10th European conference on computer supported cooperative
work, Limerick, Ireland, pp 291–310
National Transportation Safety Board (1994) Safety study: a review
of flightcrew-involved major accidents of US air carriers, 1978
through 1990. NTSB, Washington
Nofi AA (2000) Defining and measuring shared situational awareness.
Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia
OLF (2005) Integrated work processes: future work processes on the
Norwegian continental shelf. Oljeindustriens Landsforening,
Stavanger
Randall D (2000) What’s common about common information
spaces. Paper presented at the workshop on cooperative orga-
nisation of common information spaces. Technical University of
Denmark
Ringstad AJ, Andersen K (2006) Integrated operations and HSE—
major issues and strategies. Paper presented at the SPE
Cogn Tech Work (2011) 13:281–294 293
123
international conference on health, safety, and environment in oil
and gas exploration and production. Abu Dhabi, UAE
Rolland KH, Hepsø V, Monteiro E (2006) Conceptualizing common
information spaces across heterogeneous contexts: mutable
mobiles and side-effects of integration. Paper presented at the
proceedings of the 2006 20th anniversary conference on
computer supported cooperative work. Banff, Alberta, Canada
Rommetveit R, Bjørkevoll KS, Halsey GW, Larsen HF, Merlo A,
Nossaman LN, Sweep MN, Silseth KM, Ødega˚rd SI (2004)
Drilltronics: an integrated system for real-time optimization of
the drilling process Paper presented at the IADC/SPE Drilling
Conference Dallas, Texas
Rommetveit R, Bjørkevoll KS, Ødega˚rd SI, Herbert M, Halsey GW,
Kluge R (2008) Edrilling used on ekofisk for real-time drilling
supervision, simulation, 3D visualization and diagnosis. Paper
presented at the SPE intelligent energy conference and exhibi-
tion. Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Roth EM, Multer J, Raslear T (2006) Shared situation awareness as a
contributor to high reliability performance in railroad operations.
Organ Stud 27(7):967–987
Schmidt K, Bannon L (1992) Taking CSCW seriously: supporting
articulation work. Comput Support Coop work 1(1):7–40
Schulman PR (1993) The negotiated order of organizational reliabil-
ity. Adm Soc 25(3):353–372
Skarholt K, Næsje P, Hepsø V, Bye AS (2008) Integrated operations
and leadership—how virtual cooperation influences leadership
practice. In: Martorell S, Guedes Soares C, Barnett J (eds),
Safety, reliability and risk analysis: theory, methods and
applications. Proceedings of the European safety and reliability
conference, esrel 2008, and 17th SRA-Europe. Taylor & Francis
Group, London, pp 821–828
Stanton N, Stewart R, Harris D, Houghton R, Baber C, McMaster R,
Salmon P, Hoyle G, Walker G, Young M (2006) Distributed
situation awareness in dynamic systems: theoretical development
and application of an ergonomics methodology. Ergonomics
49(12):1288–1311
Suchman L (1996) Constituting shared workspaces. In: Engestro¨m Y,
Middleton D (eds) Cognition and communication at work.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 35–60
Tinmannsvik RK (2008) Robust arbeidspraksis: Hvorfor skjer det
ikke flere ulykker pa˚ sokkelen? Tapir akademisk forl.,
Trondheim
Tjora AH (2000) The technological mediation of the nursing-medical
boundary. Sociol Health Illn 22(6):721–741
TRADOC (1995). Tradoc pamphlet 525-69. Military operations:
concept for information operations. Retrieved 8 Sept 2010, from
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/tradoc/p525-69.htm
Weick KE (2007) The generative properties of richness. Acad
Manage J 50(1):14
Weick KE, Roberts KH (1993) Collective mind in organizations:
heedful interrelating on flight decks. Adm Sci Q 38(3):357–381
294 Cogn Tech Work (2011) 13:281–294
123
